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RAY FLYNN'S LEGACY: 
AMERICAN CITIES AND 
THE PROGRESSIVE 
AGENDA
Can urban progressivism flourish in a climate that is also 
hospitable to the interests of business  —  developers and 
industrialists alike? Pushing the "city limits" implies striking 
this balance, but addressing the root causes of abject urban 
poverty may ultimately exceed the capacity of the most 
progressive urban agenda.
PETER  DREIER
I
n 1987, the management at Boston's pres­
tigious Copley Plaza Hotel ordered its 
chambermaids to give up their long- 
handle mops and get down on their knees 
to wash floors. In protest, Mayor Ray Flynn 
— the son of a cleaningwoman —  moved 
his re-election inaugural celebration out of 
the hotel. Pressured by Flynn, the hotel 
workers union, local women's groups —  
and national publicity— the hotel reversed 
its decision.
Flynn, Boston's mayor from 1984 to 
1993, never forgot his humble roots or the 
pain of poverty and disrespect. Whether 
you call it "fire in the belly/' passion, or 
idealism, few politicians have Flynn's sense
of outrage against injustice— rooted in his 
Irish Catholic upbringing.
Unlike most public officials, Flynn 
knew which side he was on. Fighting with 
working people and the poor in their 
struggles for economic justice was a hall­
mark of Flynn's nine-and-a-half years reign 
as mayor —  and as a national leader for 
America's cities. InMarch of1993, President 
Clinton asked Flynn to become his Am­
bassador to the Vatican. He was confirmed 
by the Senate and left for Rome in July.
As the Los Angeles riots remind us, 
America's cities are still ticking timebombs. 
With theurban crisis gnawingat the nation's 
social and economic fabric, what do Flynn's
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accomplishments —  and failures —  tell us 
about the capacity of municipal politics to 
address the plight of our cities? What can 
American progressives learn from the ex- 
periencesofFlynn'sactivistadministration? 
As Am erica tries on a "new  kind of 
Democrat" in the White House, is there still 
room for a New Deal-CIO-Alinsky-style 
Democrat in American politics?
The Progressive D ilemma 
Progressives in local politics face a major 
dilemma: Businesses can move, but politi­
cians usually stay in one place. If local 
public officials move too aggressively to tax 
or regulate the privaté sector, business can 
threaten to pull up stakes and take their jobs 
and tax base with them. They also can 
mobilize a sustained political assault (often 
with the aid of the local media) against the 
incumbent for being unfair to business. 
Few politicians want to be stuck with the 
reputation that because they lost the "con­
fidence" of the business community, they 
drove away jobs and undermined the local 
tax base. As a result, most public officials 
accommodate themselves to business' pri­
orities.
Three major factors contribute to 
cities' relatively weak room for maneuver 
when it comes to promoting economic jus­
tice.
First, in an increasingly global 
economy, business is more and more mo­
bile. The recent wave of corporate mergers 
and consolidations highlights this trend. As 
firms become more internationalized, their 
ability to set the groundrules of the game 
increases as well. As local or regional 
businesses are picked off by multinational
corporations, communities becam e pawns 
in an international business confidence 
game. Plan ts are opened or closed, expanded 
or contracted, according to  priorities es­
tablished in corporate headquarters. Ob­
viously som e firms and industries are more 
mobilethan others,butlocaloffidals,unions, 
or community groups cannot always know 
when the threat of disinvestment is real. 
This puts them  at a disadvantage if they 
want to "call the bluff' of businesses.
Second, Am erica's federal system—  
especially the fragm entation of political 
boundaries and authority, and the uneven 
level of fiscal resources —  m akes it easier 
for businesses to play "Russian roulette" 
with local communities. This makes it dif­
ficult for cities and suburbs to form coop­
erative partnerships to prom ote metro­
politan areas, and for states to join together 
to prom ote healthy regions.
If the U.S. had uniform  rules and 
law s— regarding tax rates, environmental 
regulations, labor-m anagem ent relations, 
and other conditions —  it w ould be much 
more difficult for businesses to play dties, 
states, and regions against each other. Be­
cause our federal system allow s states and 
localities to set m any of these conditions, 
footloose businesses can look for the best 
"business clim ate"— low w ages, Idw taxés, 
lax environmental regulations and a "union 
free" atmosphere. In this situation, many 
state and local governm ent officials feel 
that in order to attract or m aintain jobs, they 
have to participate in "bidding wars" to 
attract capital. This puts each partidpant in 
a weaker bargaining position and under­
mines the economic and fiscal health of all 
communities. Rather than promoting a
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common nationalstandard and a more level 
playing field, federal laws actually promote 
this competition. The Taft-Hartley Act, for 
example, allows states to enact anti-union 
"right to work" laws. Cities establish their 
own property tax rates and can cut special 
deals for particular investment projects.
Third, national and local campaign 
finance laws exacerbate the proclivities of 
public officials to align themselves with the 
prioritiesof "business" asawholeorspedfic 
industries or firms. In Congress, "bringing 
home the bacon" typically means giving 
federal tax breaks or subsidies to lure a 
company to one's district. State and local 
officials play the same game. The public 
and the press are no longer shocked that the 
campaign war chests of political candidates 
(particularly incumbents) are lined with 
contributions from businesses and indus­
tries thatreceivespedal favors. Thesefavors 
often undermine the economic health of 
America's cities. For example, the banking 
industry's political clout led the White 
House and Congress to deregulate the 
banks, leading to the 1980s orgy of specu­
lation and redlining the S&L scandal and 
the current banking mess. Since the end of 
World War II, most military contracts and 
bases have been located in rural areas and 
suburbs, draining jobs and tax revenues 
from our central cities.
These realities led a number of 
prominent urban experts to argue that local 
governments have little room for maneuver 
to adopt progressive policies that redis­
tribute wealth, income, and political power. 
The most cogent expression of this view —  
Paul Peterson's 1981 book, City Limits' —  
argued that municipal government poli­
cies emerge largely in response to larger 
economic forces. The market, Peterson 
argued, dictates politics and policy. Cities 
must promote private economic growth; 
the alternative is decay and stagnation. 
Progressiveredistributivepolideshurt cities 
because they entail increased taxes an d /or 
reduced services for those residents and 
businesses that contribute most to the city's 
tax base and economic well-being. Ac­
cording to Peterson, only the federal gov­
ernment can promote redistributive social 
welfare policies.
In their highly-regarded 1987 book, 
Urban Fortunes,2 sociologists H arvey  
Molotch and John Logan portrayed urban 
"growth machines" as coalitions of business, 
developers, labor, the media, and public 
officials, united in their quest to improve 
the business climate by attracting new in­
vestment. These growth coalitions steer 
local development policies to intensify land 
use, increase rents, and generally enhance 
the profitability of private enterprise.
This viewpoint became the conven­
tional wisdom among academic urban ex­
perts throughout the 1980s. By emphasiz­
ing the clearly limited room for political 
maneuver, this grim perspective could 
hardly inspire activists to view local politics 
as an arena for progressive reform.
Just how much room exists, however, 
is rarely tested. Most elected officials are 
unwilling to see just how far they can push. 
But some are bolder than others, particu­
larly when they are emboldened by grass­
roots movements with political savvy and 
staying power. Indeed, what's missing from 
these grim analyses is the potential of po­
litical organizing, political skills, and po-
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native vision and agenda.3
Since the mid-1970s, in fact, pro­
gressive grass-roots m ovem ents have 
gained a foothold in running local govern­
ments. In a few cases, they have actually 
taken power. Their leaders and allies have 
been catapulted to elective office, including 
mayor and dty council.
Most of these progressive regimes 
took root in smaller cities, mostly based in 
university settings, such as Burlington, 
Cambridge, Madison, and Berkeley, Santa 
Cruz, and Santa Monica. Among America's 
major urban centers, only in Cleveland, San 
Francisco, Chicago, and Bos­
ton did progressive activists 
achieve electoral success and 
seek to utilize local govern­
ment to promote an agenda 
of economic and social re­
form. In every case, housing 
and com m unity develop­
ment issues played a key role 
in mobilizing supporters and 
in forginga governing regime.
Among the large dties, 
however, only in Boston did 
the progressive coalition re­
main in power long enough to carry out its 
agenda. In Cleveland, M ayor Dennis 
Kucinich, elected in 1977, was defeated af­
ter only a single two-year term. In San 
Francisco, Mayor George Moscone, who 
was elected 1975, was murdered three years 
later, along with his ally, Supervisor Harvey 
Milk. Upon Moscone's death, Board of 
Supervisors President Dianne Feinstein,4 a 
modéra te on issues of economic reform and 
developm ent, became m ayor and was
elected in 1979 and re-elected in 1983. Ht 
successor, state legislator A rt Agnos, wa 
elected in 1987 on a progressive housin 
platform and with the support of housin, 
activists, but he lasted only one four-yea 
term, defeated in part by voter frustratioi 
about the city's persistent homelessnes 
problem.
In Chicago, Congressman Harolc 
Washington was catapulted to the mayori 
office in 1983 by an energized neighbor 
hood-based coalition rooted in the African 
A m erican com m unity. Like Kucinich 
Moscone, and Agnos, Washington did ba ttk 
with the dty council, the business commu­
nity, and m oderate voters, 
which limited his ability tc 
govern and carry  out his 
progressive agenda. Still, the 
W ashington regim e tilted 
City H all policies toward 
progressive neighborhood- 
oriented reform s and helped 
him win re-election in 1987. 
Unfortunately, Washington 
died of a heart attack a few 
months later. The political 
coalition that brought him to 
power soon fragmented.
In contrast to these short-term  ex­
periments, a progressive regim e, led by 
M ayor Flynn, endured in office for nine 
years. First elected in 1983, Flynn was re­
elected to successive four-year terms in 1987 
and 1991. (He left office in July 1993, in the 
middle of his third tenn, to serve as Presi­
dent Clinton's Ambassador to the Vatican). 
Flynn had enough time to carry out much of 
his reform agenda. In doing so, the Flynn 
regime demonstrated that, despite major
The public and the 
press are no longer 
shocked that the 
campaign war chests 
o f political candidates 
...a r e  lined loith 
contributions from  
businesses and 
industries...
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political and economic obstacles, local gov­
ernment can be progressive and humane. 
Contrary to the gloomy views of many 
academic observers and media pundits, the 
Flynn coalition showed that it is not im­
perative for big-city mayors tö play to racial 
fears (like Ed Koch inNewYorkorColeman 
Young in Detroit), or to embrace the growth- 
at-all-costs dow ntow n developm ent 
agenda, to be politically successful.
Lacking significant federal funds, the 
Flynn administration developed policies 
that looked to the booming local private 
economy in order to carry out these "re­
distributive" goals. Some of these policies 
took the form of so-called "public-private" 
partnerships, while others involved gov­
ernment regulation (such as zoning and 
rent control) of the private sector. The un­
derlying assumption of these policies is that 
the benefits of the private economy's growth 
would not automatically "trickle down" to 
Boston's non-affluent residents; they had to 
be steered in that direction by government 
action.
From South Boston to C ity H all 
Flynn's biography has many elements of a 
proletarian novel or an organizer's dream- 
come-true. The son of a longshoreman and 
cleaningwoman, Flynn grew up in Gate of 
Heaven Parish in South Boston, a gritty 
working class Irish neighborhood where 
(except for college, a stint in the army, and 
now Rome) he has lived his entire life and 
attended daily mass. When his father took 
sick and could no longer work, his mother 
cleaned offices in Boston's downtown busi­
ness district at night. A three-sport athletic 
star at South Boston High School, he went
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to Providence College on a basketball 
scholarship, becam e an academ ic All- 
American, and was voted MVP at the 1962 
NTT competition, where he led PC to the 
championship.
After he just missed making the Bos­
ton Celtics team, Flynn worked as a youth 
worker, high school teacher, and probation 
officer, and organized neighborhood youth 
sporte leagues. He turned his sports-hero 
celebrity status into a political career. In 
1970, he ran successfully for the state legis­
lature from South Boston. There, he gener­
ally represented the views of his South 
Boston constituents. He supported unions, 
low-cost housing, and tenants rights, fought 
redlining, airport expansion, and welfare 
cutbacks. He advocated more state funding 
for special needs schoolchildren. He co­
sponsored a bill to end government-funded 
abortions.
He also opposed busing, which a 
federal judge in 1974 ordered to remedy 
school segregation, igniting a major protest 
in Boston. Hynn based his opposition in 
clear class terms: he saw busing as pitting 
poor black and white families against each 
other within a second-rate school system, 
while affluent suburbanites sent their kids 
to well-endowed schools. Although Flynn 
opposed court-ordered busing, he never 
joined the right-wing factions that engaged 
in violence and often resorted to race ha­
tred. He refused tojoinmilitantanti-busers, 
such as City Councilwomen Louise Day 
Hicks and State Senator (now Senate 
President) William Bulger, in a statement of 
resistance with racist overtones. While 
parents and schoolchildren were hurling 
rocks at black students, Hynn was walking
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the streets, urging an end to the violence. 
His moderation alienated some of the more 
extremist elements in his own community. 
His car was firebombed and his family 
received death threats over the phone. Still, 
some suburban liberals, campus-based 
radicals and the pro-busing Boston Globe 
painted all opponents to busing —  and all 
South Boston residents —  with the same 
brush.
In1977, Flynn was elected to a seat on 
the Boston City Council (all nine members 
were then elected at-large), and began a 
transformation from a parochial South 
Boston pol with progressive leanings to a 
crusader with dtywide appeal.
As an at-large City Councilor, and an 
18-hour-a-day workaholic, Flynn attended 
numerous meetings across the city (often 
several a night). He saw similar problems 
facing residents in poor and working class 
neighborhoods, whether predominantly 
white, black or Hispanic in population. He 
became the hardest working City Coun­
cilor, sponsoring legislation and pulling 
strings to help tenants in public and private 
housing (such as getting housing inspec­
tors to respond to tenant complaints), 
fighting the utility companies for hiking 
their rates, and supporting unions, welfare 
recipients and working women— all while 
completing a master's degree in education 
at Harvard.
On the City Council, Flynn's tenants' 
rights bills were usually defeated by 7-to-2 
or8-to-l votes. Flynn sawhow his colleagues 
bowed to the city's powerful real estate 
lobby, the biggest donor to politicians. As 
City Councilor, and later as mayor, he often 
said, "Washington has the oil lobby. We
have the greedy Greater Boston Real Estate 
Board." H is activism helped expand his 
citywide base. In the 1981 citywide City 
Council elections, Flynn w as the leading 
vote-getter by a wide m argin.
In 1983, Boston w as ready to explode 
socially and politically. In the previous two 
decades, Boston had been transformed from 
a depressed, low-rise city of mostly white 
ethnic neighborhoods to a more vibrant 
high-rise d ty  com posed increasingly of 
young professional w orkersand new Third 
W orld immigrants. The d ty  had become a 
m agnet for real estate speculation. The 
downtown economy w as booming, sym­
bolized by shiny new skyscrapers, but most 
Boston residents felt left o u t— they weren't 
getting a fair share of theprosperity. Tenants 
(who comprised tw o-thirds of Boston's 
population) faced skyrocketing rents and 
condom inium  con version s that were 
pushing elderly and poor people out of 
their apartments. Escalating housing prices 
m ade it alm ost im possible for young 
working families to purchase a house. The 
dty's poor and working class neighbor­
hoods, espedally black and Flispanic areas, 
were scarred by abandoned buildings and 
vacant lots. . Arson was reaching epidemic 
proportions. A growing num ber of home­
less people slept in the city's downtown 
streets, parks and alleyways.
The ugly wounds of racial division 
— exacerbated by the busing wars and 
highly publicized events such as the brutal 
shooting and paralysis of black teenager 
Daryl Williams during a high school foot­
ball gam e in the all-w hite Charlestown 
neighborhood— were still festering. Blacks 
feared traveling in many w hite neighbor­
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hoods. Few blacks even ventured to Fenway 
Park to watch the Red Sox— the last major 
league team to hire a black player. Banks 
redlined the city's neighborhoods with im­
punity. The public housing developments 
of the Boston Housing Authority, placed in 
court receivership for chronic mismanage­
ment, were blatantly segregated. City gov­
ernment and private businesses had few 
Blacks,Hispanics or Asians inkey decision­
making positions. Mistrust of Mayor 
Kevin W hite'sQty Hall waspalpableacross 
the dty. Residents correctly believed that 
the delivery of basic city services —  sani­
tation, park maintenance, snow removal—  
was based not on equal treatment but on 
whom you knew in City Hall or where you 
lived. They viewed the White administra­
tion (in office since1968) as distant, arrogant 
and corrupt —  more concerned with ex­
pensive overseas junkets and campaign 
contributionsfrom big developers than with 
the day-to-day problems of neighborhood 
residents. Faced with the burgeoning anger 
andaloomingcampaignfmancecorruption 
scandal, White called it quits in May 1983, 
leaving the mayoral contest wide open. 
Seven candidates threw their hats into the 
ring.
When Rynn announced his candi­
dacy for Mayor in front of a public housing 
project— pledging to be a people's mayor, 
to share the city's prosperity with the city's 
have-nots— few people gave the maverick 
City Councilor a chance. He had no money. 
He had no political organization. He had 
few connections to the media or business 
establishments.
In the hotly-contested preliminary 
election to choose two finalists, Flynn and
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Mel King, a radical black state legislator, 
helped frame the campaign agenda. At 
public forums and in house meetings, the 
major theme was the "downtown versus 
the neighborhoods." The issue that trig­
gered the most debate was linkage— a fee 
on downtown developers to raise funds for 
affordable housing. Flynn and King were 
the top two vote-getters against the other 
downtown-oriented candidates. On the 
same day, two non-binding referenda 
pushed by thestatewideritizenactiongioup 
Massachusetts Fair Share— for enactment 
of a linkage policy and thecreation of neigh­
borhood councils —  passed overwhelm­
ingly. The voters had made a clear choice 
for a neighborhood-oriented agenda. 
Boston'sprogressiveaetivistsweredivided 
between Flynn and King— a bitter split. In 
the run-off, Flynn bested King by a 2-to-l 
margin.
What catapulted Flynn to victory 
was a grass-roots campaign that drew on 
the growing spirit of activism that spread 
across Boston (and many other cities) dur­
ing the 1970s and early 1980s. It was em­
bodied in groups like Massachusetts Fair 
Share, Nine-to-Five (an organization of 
women office workers), the Massachusetts 
Tenants O rganization, and the Hotel 
Workers Union— militant, confrontational 
groups dedicated toempowermg people in 
their communities and workplaces, draw­
ing on the traditions of the CIO unions and 
Saul Alinsky's organizing tactics in fighting 
for social and economic justice. It also in- 
cludedagrowingnetworkofneighborhood 
associations that had spent the previous 
decade fighting the urban renewal bull­
dozer, the expansion of the Logan Airport,
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hospitals, and universities, and the uneven 
delivery of municipal services. The orga­
nizers and leaders of these and similar 
groups viewed Flynn as the symbol of their 
anger and as a vehicle for realizing their 
potential. At the same time, Flynn's victory 
shocked the political world and caused 
anxiety in the city's corporate boardrooms.
Building a Governing Coalition 
After the election, Flynn's challenge was to 
build a governing populist coalition that 
includedworking class whites, thegrowing 
minority populations, and the progressive 
activists —  to focus on issues that built 
bridges betw een these 
groups. A key line in Flynn's 
inauguration speech pro­
jected this view of the world:
"The hopes that unite us are 
greater than the fears that 
divide us."
Now, almost a decade 
later, how much of that vision 
has become reality? Politi­
cally, Flynn obviously suc­
ceeded. He was re-elected twice, in1987and 
1991, with over two-thirds of the vote both 
times. He won higher margins in black and 
Hispanic areas of thecity than among white 
voters— an unusual accomplishment for a 
whitepolitidan.Butwhatdidheaccomplish 
in terms of his policy agenda? What's his 
legacy to Boston and to the nation as an 
urban leader? Flynn took care of the civic 
housekeeping tasks that are the traditional 
litmus tests for municipal officials —  espe­
cially with business leaders and Wall Street. 
He took over a city with a $40 million deficit, 
balanced the budget each year, improved
the city's fiscal controls, and upgraded its 
bond rating each year to the highest in the 
city's history.
Soon after taking office, Flynnimme- 
diately had to deal with the city's fiscal 
problems. His policy priority w as to obtain 
new state aid and authority to raise new 
local taxes from the state legislature in order 
to balance the city's budget and improve its 
bond rating without severe cuts in city ser­
vices. M any state legislators (including 
Boston's own delegation) w ere suspicious 
of the city's w aste and inefficiency, and 
Mayor W hite's high-roller lifestyle. Flynn, 
a former legislator himself, recognized that 
he needed the help of the 
business com m unity —  par­
ticularly its w atchdog group, 
the Boston M unicipal Re­
search Bureau —  to gain the 
credibility to obtain the addi­
tional revenues, Flynn had to 
convince them that he would 
spend the m oney cost-effec­
tively, H e recruited indi­
viduals from  the business 
community for top positions in the city's 
budget and treasury departm ents. He es­
tablished an advisory com m ittee, includ­
ing representatives from the business com­
munity, to improve managem ent and bud­
get operations, and took its recommenda­
tions to "open the books" regarding the 
city's fiscal picture (something W hite had 
refused to do).
Flynn also campaigned around the 
state— meeting with local officials, business 
groups, unions, and others —  to convince 
them to support the state legislation. He 
argued that Boston's econom ic health was
A  key line in Flynn's
inauguration speech 
projected this view of 
the world: "The hopes 
that unite us are greater 
. than the fears that 
divide us."'
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key to the entire state's well-being —  that 
Boston generated the jobs, the state sales- 
tax revenue, and the institutional founda­
tion (hospitals, colleges, and cu ltural/ 
sports) that benefited the entire state. (A  
few years later, when pundits began to 
argue that cities had become economically 
obsolete in the face of "ed g e city "  
suburbanization, Flynn would echo this 
theme as President of the U.S. Conference 
ofMayors: "A s cities go, so goes Am erica").
The Research Bureau gave the Flynn 
administration its stamp-of-approval and 
helped lobby for the additional revenues. 
Flynn's revenue package was initially de­
feated, but on its second try, the legislature 
approved it. The additional revenues, 
budget and management reform s, and the 
city's strong developm ent market, also 
helped im prove the city's bond rating. 
Neighborhood residents care more about 
the visible bread-and-butter matters. Dur­
ing Flynn's nine years, Boston built an un­
precedented number of affordable housing 
units, dramatically improved the city's parks 
and recreation centers, broke ground on a 
new Boston City Hospital complex when 
most cities are closing municipal hospitals, 
and created the city's first long-term capital 
plan to fix Boston's streets, infrastructure, 
and schoolbuildings, and add new precinct 
stations and recreational centers.
Addressing gentrification and the 
quality of neighborhood life w as key to the 
Flynn agenda. This meant taking on some 
powerful political forces. Soon after taking 
office, the Ryrtn administration fought the 
real estate industry to allow the city to 
implement a "linkage" policy, requiring 
downtown developers to put funds into a
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neighborhood housing fund. D uring 
Flynn's regime, the linkage program  netted 
over $70 million and helped create over 
8,000 units of affordable housing. Hynn 
often battled with the landlord lobby to 
enact rent control and strong tenants'-rights 
law s— a bitter fight that helped protect the 
city 's m ost vulnerable residents from  
gentrification. Under theguidanceofRynn's 
development director Steve Coyle (now  
head of the AFL-CIO's housing investment 
program ), Boston instituted controversial 
"downzoning" safeguards, which halted 
the creeping "M anhattanization" that 
threatened to overwhelm the city's historic 
downtown and other adjacent neighbor­
hoods.
W ith Hynn in office, the d ty  regained 
control of the Boston Housing Authority 
from court receivership. In the fall of 1987, 
a few weeks before his first re-election day, 
Hynn announced a plan to desegregate the 
all-white BHA developments in his own 
neighborhood. When the votes were in, 
Rynnhad won every ward in thecity except 
South Boston. There are no longer any all- 
white BHA developments, and the inte­
gration of public housing has continued 
with only a few incidents of racial antago­
nism.
Hynn also put forward a local version 
of industrial policy, called the "Boston jobs" 
program. It required private developers 
who obtained city permits to hire Boston 
residents for one-half of all the construction 
jobs —  minorities for one-quarter, and 
women for one-tenth. During Hynn's ten­
ure, Boston stopped doing business with 
corporations that invested in South Africa 
and Northern Ireland.
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These specific achievements are importent, 
but Flynn's most lasting legacy will be the 
combination of his activistapproach to gov­
ernment and his personal compassion. As 
Boston's m ayor, Flynn w as equal parts 
politician, organizer, and social worker.
Flynn brought a few dozen progres­
sive activists —  from Massachusetts Fair 
Share, tenant groups, neighborhood asso­
ciations, unions, Nine-to-Five, legal services, 
and environmental organizations —  into 
top policy and administrative positions in 
City HalLButmore importantly, hebrought 
a new spirit —  activism, idealism, com­
passion — into governm ent
Flynn personified this approach by 
being accessible, demonstrating his energy 
and his caring in many big and small ways 
—  quietly participa ting in a memorial ser­
vice for the homeless, jogging across the 
city and stopping to chat with people, vis­
iting families victimized by a fire or other 
tragedy. M any of his key accomplishments 
as M ayor can be traced to his activist in­
stincts. Regardless of the issue, Flynn w as 
m ost effective when he w as waging a 
campaign for reform and justice, not just 
presidingoverdtygovernmentfrombehind 
his desk.
Flynn and his activist cadre devel­
oped a new approach to government— the 
permanent organizing campaign. They ac­
tively reached outtoincludeneighborhood 
residents in city government. He turned 
the tables on the idea that "you can't fight 
City H all." M ore often than not, it w as City 
Hall working with neighborhood groups 
fighting tire banks (over redlining), the de­
velopers (to require linkage and other con­
cessions to  neighborhood vitality), the 
landlords (for promoting gentrification), the 
elected School Com m ittee (for ignoring the 
needs of the stu d en ts), th e sta te  
governm ent's Beacon Hill establishment 
(for treating Boston, the state capital, like a 
Third W orld colony), and even the federal 
government. lik e  no other big-dty mayor 
in Am erica, Flynn took on the powerful on 
behalf of the powerless.
Flynn's relationship to the business 
community, and toorganized labor, reflects 
his approach. In m any cities, the local 
business com m unity wields considerable 
political pow er— either directly (through 
cam paign contributions) or indirectly  
(through thethreatof disinvestment). Since 
the 1950s, a group called the Coordinating 
Committee (nick-named "the V ault") —  
the CEOs of Boston's largest em ployers—  
played that role, m eeting regularly to in­
fluence thed ty  governm ent's agenda, from  
urban renewal to fiscal m atters. By the 
1980s, the Vault w as still a  powerful force in 
Boston politics, but B oston's business 
community w as less cohesive than it had 
been in previous decades. The V ault w as no 
longer com posed prim arily of the Brahmin 
sodaleHte,butby m anagersw hohad moved 
up through the corporate ranks. A  growing 
number of Boston's largest private em­
ployers — for exam ple, Shawmut Bank and 
the Bank of New England —  w ere pur­
chased by out-of-tow n conglom erates.
Although the Vault served as a uni­
fying umbrella group to iron out political 
and policy differences, Boston's business 
community w as increasingly fragmented. 
Each faction —  the high-tech industry, the 
banks, the developers and landlords, the
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utilities, the money managers, hotels, and 
the major universities and hospitals— had 
its own agenda. Still, the Vault could mo­
bilize business leaders to target campaign 
contributions to favored political candi­
dates. Itsresearch arm,theBostonMunidpal 
Research Bureau, which monitored dty fi­
nances, still had credibility with the media. 
What the business leaders wanted was a 
"healthy business climate" and through 
most of the 1980s, business in Boston and 
across Massachusetts was booming.
Flynn had received no support from  
the Vault members —  or any other major 
sectors of the business community— dur­
ing his campaign. In fact, he 
refused to take campaign 
contributions from develop  
ers (or their lawyers) with 
projects pending before dty  
agendes. The business com­
munity was notpleased when 
Flynn was first elected. In the 
two subsequent m ayoral 
races, most business leaders 
no doubt would have liked to 
find a candidate to defeat 
Flynn— as their counterparts 
in Cleveland had done w ith Dennis 
Kudnichin the1970s. ButBoston'sbusiness 
leaders knew they couldn't get rid of the 
popular Flynn, so they realized they had to 
learn to live with him and accommodate his 
agenda.
Flynn was never comfortable with 
Boston's corporate elite. As mayor, the few 
personal relationships he developed within 
the high-level business community tended 
to be with other Irish-Americans from 
working class origins. They served as his
liaisons with the business community. He 
occassionally called on business leaders for 
specific things, such as summer jobs for 
youth, support for school reform, and fi­
nancing of low-income housing. When 
necessary, he would go on the offensive—  
doing battle with some of Boston's corpo­
rate heavyweights. For the most part, 
though, the relationship between City Hall 
and the business community was an un­
easy truce, with occasional brushfire battles.
Several inddents reflect the Flynn 
regime's approach. In 1985, Boston's hotel 
owners and Local 26 of the hotel and restau­
rant workers union were poised for a long 
and bitter strike. The militant, 
radally diverse union had 
sent letters to travel agents, 
airlines and assodations with 
scheduled conventions 
warning about possible dis­
ruption. The hotel owners as- 
sociation  had advertised  
widely for strikebreakers and 
set up a hiring hall. But while 
the two sides were still at the 
bargaining table, Flynn qui­
etly sent word to the owners 
(through his police chief) that they could 
not count on the Boston Police Department 
to protect the strikebreakers from angry 
strikers or preserve order outside or within 
the hotels. Flynn's unpublicized action 
broke the owners' resolve. They settled —  
and Local 26 won an important victory.
A few years later, Flynn traveled to 
southwestern Virginia to visit coal-mining 
families during the United Mine Workers' 
harsh strike against the Pittston Coal Group 
— drawingattention to theminers' struggle
For the most part, 
...th e  relationship 
between City Hall and 
the business 
community was an 
uneasy truce, with 
occasional brushfire 
battles.
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in the Boston media. While meeting with 
UMW president Richard Trumka, Flynn 
learned that one of Pittston's board mem­
bers, William Craig, was Vice Chairm an of 
Shawmut Bank, Boston's second largest 
lender and a powerful institution. W hen 
Flynn returned to Boston, he publicly 
threatened to withdraw tire city's deposits 
from the bank unless Craig resigned from  
Pittston's board.
In 1989, two studies —  one spon­
sored by Flynn's own planning agency (the 
BostonRedevelopmentAuthority)— found 
that Boston's major banks were discrimi­
nating in their m ortgage lending, hiring, 
and branch location practices. Flynn w as 
outraged. Someaidesadvised Flynn thathe 
had little to gain politically by talcing on the 
powerful banking industry. But Flynn ig­
nored thatadviceandfollowed his instincts. 
For more than a year Flynn, working closely 
with community activists, waged a guerilla- 
style campaign to pressure the banks to 
change their ways. He m et privately with 
the heads of the major banks and warned 
them to take action or else he'd raise hell. 
His aides m et with community activists to 
hammer out a "wish list" of demands to  
present to the banks. Flynn announced a 
"linked deposit" policy to issue a regular 
city-sponsored "report card " on bank 
practices and, then, withdraw dty funds 
from banks with poor track records, while 
expanding city deposits in banks that 
worked to meet neighborhood needs.
The result was an unprecedented 
$400 million community reinvestm ent 
agreement —  with the banks pledging to 
open new branches, change their lending 
and hiring practices, and work more closely
withCDCs and com m unity groups. There's 
been a sea-changein the banks' behavior—  
andm oreBostonresidentshavem ortgages, 
small business loans, and bank jobs because 
of it. In fact, Boston is probably the only 
major d ty  in Am erica w here banks are 
opening new  branches (five so far) ininner- 
d ty neighborhoods.
Like m any dries, Boston had a large 
inventory of federally subsidized low-in­
come apartm ent buildings —  built or re­
stored in the 1960s and 1970s —  that had 
been abandoned by their ow ners after the 
tax breaks ran out o r operating costs in­
creased faster than the H U D  subsidies. 
These buildings w ere m ore than eyesores 
or drughavens. They w ere visiblereminders 
of governm ent's indifference tow ard poor 
people —  particularly people o f color. 
Flynn and com m unity activists w aged a 
successful five-year cam paign to  pressure 
HUD Secretary Sam Pierce to turn over 
2,000 of these H UD-ow ned subsidized 
apartm ents (in about 70 buildings) to 
community-based nonprofits and tenant 
organizations. He spoke at rallies, w rote 
angry public letters to President Reagan 
and Secretary Pierce, lobbied Boston's 
C ongressional d elegation , an d  urged  
Boston's Republican business leaders to 
use their W hite House ties to m ove HUD 
along. (Clinton's HUD Secretary, former 
San Antonio M ayor H enry Cisneros, is 
changing agency policy to replicate Boston's 
success in turning around troubled HUD 
projects).
Sharing and U sing P ow er 
Surely som e members of the business es­
tablishment viewed Flynn as a radical. He
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admired radicals and activists, but he re­
mained skeptical of ideology, and believed 
that ideologues don't make good politi­
cians. His heroes were St. Francis, Pope Leo 
Xin (the "workers' pope"); Paul Sullivan 
(the founder of Boston's first homeless 
shelter), his father (a solid union man), and 
Hubert Humphrey, whom he served as a 
personal aide during the 1968 presidential 
campaign (Flynn's first taste of national 
politics). Flynn had never heard of Dorothy 
Day or the Catholic W orker movement, but 
in many ways he embodied its spirit.
Like few other politicians, Flynn was 
willing to share power —  not with other 
politicians (whom Flynn usually pushed 
aside), but with organized citizen groups. 
Rynn recognized the importance of em­
powering people to help themselves. He 
also recognized thathavingastrongactivist 
progressive movement gave him more room  
for maneuver in dealing with the business 
community, the City Council, the state 
government, and even Washington.
The Flynn regime helped build a 
strong network of community-based non­
profithousing developers, who became the 
backbone of the city's successful effort to 
build and rehabilitate affordable housing. 
With Hynn in office, City Hall gave neigh­
borhood groups a strong voice in planning 
development and other decisions, through 
neighborhood councils, zoning committees, 
and project-specific advisory groups. The 
Flynn administra lion funded tenant groups 
to organize against slumlords, community 
crime watch groups to fight arsonists and 
drug dealers, and neighborhood organiza­
tions to organize residents for community 
improvement.
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In one unprecedented example, the 
dty government delegated its urban re­
newal powers (including its eminent do­
main authority) to a community group, the 
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in 
Roxbury, to help local activists rebuild a 
decaying area of vacant lots, abandoned 
buildings, and sub-standard housing, 
owned by a crazy-quilt of absentee owners. 
S on * City Flail officials— including Robert 
Farrell, the chairman of the Boston Rede­
velopment Authority board, who was 
originally appointed by Mayor White —  
warned Flynn that giving DSNI that kind of 
authority would set a dangerous precedent. 
Flynn ignored their advice —  and soon 
replaced Farrell as BRA chair.
Activists and organizers across the 
country often pointed to Boston as the most 
progressive dty government in terms of 
working with grass-roots groups. Of course, 
there are always tensions when politidans 
and grass-roots groups work together, 
particularly around the question of who 
wiUgetthecreditforpoliticalvidories. The 
Hynn administration was not immune to 
these tensions, but there was enough trust 
between Boston's activists and the Flynn 
government that they could work together 
around a common agenda.
Thebigger problem was one of rising 
expectations. Hynn's 1983 election was 
heralded as a dramatic reformation in local 
politics. Soop after taking office, Hynn 
embarked on a wFiirlwind series of "town 
meetings" in every neighborhood. On ev­
ery imaginable issue —  housing, crime, 
health care, historic preservation, race re­
lations, recreation, street repairs, and many 
others —  Boston residents expected dra­
392 • F A i.I. 199.3 NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW
'FEATURE'
matic improvement. There was no way for 
a dty government to fulfill all these wishes, 
yet Flynn did not want to exacerbate people's 
cynicism or dash their hopes. Over the 
years, according to opinion surveys, Flynn 
had extraordinarily high approval ratings 
— both personally and in terms of his per­
formance as Mayor. Even residents who 
expressed disapproval of some aspect of 
dty services did not blame Flynn for the 
problem.
Part of the reason for this phenom­
enon was Flynn's obvious penchant for 
hard work and his constant visibility in 
every neighborhood. But another part was 
Flynn's persistent efforts to educate 
Bostonians about the responsibility of the 
federal and state governments, and the cor­
porate sector, for the problems facing Bos­
ton and other American dties. Flynn real­
ized that dties cannot, on their own, solve 
the myriad of urban problems. He moved 
into City Hall at the worst possible moment 
for a big-dty mayor —  when the Reagan 
Administration was slashing federal funds 
to help the poor, build low-income housing, 
and provide fiscal assistance to dties. The 
d t /s  strong economy gave Hynn the op­
portunity to demand more from develop  
ers, banks and business in general, and he 
took advantage of that opportunity, but 
that kind of leverage was overwhelmed by 
the dramatic cuts in federal aid.
A few years later, espedally after 
Republican William Weld became Gover­
nor, Beacon Hill would rub salt in Boston's 
wounds by slashing state aid. When the 
New England economy went into a tailspin 
in 1989, Boston was hit hard. Like other 
municipal governments dependent on the
regressive property tax (exacerbated by 
Proposition 2-1/2, the 1980 statewide tax­
cutting measure that had thrown Boston 
and other M assachusetts dties on the verge 
of bankruptcy), Boston had few options but 
to cut program s. So while Flynn can be 
proud of his success in keeping the budget 
balanced, maintaining basic d ty  service, 
and calm ing the d t / s  radal tensions (es- 
pedallyin light of the Los Angeles riots), the 
last few  years of his regim e w ere toughones 
for a progressive m ayor.
W orking C lass D emocrat 
Many local journalists and poli tical observ­
ers accused Flynn of hogging the limelight. 
Certainly Flynn has an affinity for the 
cam era. But Flynn used this tactic not only 
as a w ay to shine the spotlight on himself, 
but to prom ote the causes he cared about. 
Most politidans try to climb the political 
ladder by playing footsie with the rich and 
powerful. Flynn used his office to draw  
public attention to the suffering of the 
homeless, to attract notice to the plight of 
poor renters, to create greater awareness 
about the AIDS epidemic, to rally public 
opinion against human rights violations in 
Northern Ireland and South A frica.
W hile the national press, grass-roots 
groups, and his fellow urban leaders rec­
ognized H ynn's efforts as both m ayor and 
national urban spokesman, Boston's own 
opinion leaders never really embraced 
Hynn, his style of governm ent, or his ven­
tures into national issues. The liberal Boston 
Globe never forgave (or understood ) Flynn's 
opposition to court-ordered busing, objected 
to his pro-life views (even though he never 
tried to stop abortions at Boston City Hos-
FAl.t. i w  • .TONATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW
'FEATURE'
American CmESANDTHE P rogressive A genda
pitai), and derided his proletarian cultural 
tastes. (Like our new President, he preferred 
McDonald's to up-scale cuisine). The con­
servative tabloid Boston Herald consistently 
rebuked Flynnfor surroundinghimself with 
"Sandinista" aides, for failing to give def­
erence to the city's business establishment, 
and for supporting rent control and low- 
income housing.
Race relations is the most perplexing 
issuein America's cities— and Flynn walked 
a political and personal tightrope in dealing 
with Boston's tortured racial climate. De­
spite many liberals' stereotypes of the Irish 
working class in general and South Boston 
in particular, almost everyone (including 
the New York Times} recognize! Flynn's 
personal role in healing Boston's racial cli­
mate.
Flynn recognized that racism often 
added an extra burden, so he supported 
strong fair housing laws, fought banks for 
their racial redlining, and supported affir­
mative action hiring and contracting in Q ty  
Hall. But at heart, Flynn was an archetypical 
social democrat— a universalist in an era of 
racial separatism. Long before he had read 
William J. Wilson's 1987 book, The Truly 
Disadvantaged —  which argues that race- 
neutral good-enough-for-all approaches 
(such as universal health care and full em­
ployment labor market policies) are pref­
erable to race-specific anti-poverty pro­
grams —  Flynn viewed race through the 
prism of class.5 He believed that people 
deserved good jobs, decent housing, af­
fordable health care, and good schools, re­
gardless of color— and thatbuilding bridges 
around common problems was the best 
political strategy. His rhetoric stressed
"fairness," "dignity" and "equality."
In reality, because of the dispropor­
tionate poverty among Boston's black and 
Hispanic populations, the bulk of the city's 
discretionary resources —  police, housing 
subsidies, health care programs, building 
inspections, recreation and parks funding 
— went to these communities. This angered 
some white politicians and white neigh­
borhood leaders. But Flynn's blue-collar 
South Boston origins, his "regular guy" 
demeanor, and his constant presence in the 
city's neighborhoods (a GlobepoU found tha t 
almost half of Boston's residents had met 
Flynn at least once) helped to dampen the 
racial animosity that a more affluent "lim­
ousine liberal" might have exacerbated.
Boston was not immune from the 
overall decay of America's cities during the 
1980s. Still, during Flynn's m ayoralty, 
poverty declined, violent crime was re­
duced, and housing conditions improved 
significantly among Boston's minorities. 
Nevertheless, Flynn's even-handedness on 
race matters often infuriated some of the 
city's African-American leaders.
In 1986, a small group of African- 
American activists organized a secession 
campaign, waged through a non-binding 
ballot initiative, to create an independent 
city, called "Mandela," m adeupof Boston's 
predominantly blackneighborhoods. Along 
with the black clergy, many black commu­
nity leaders, and the city's business leaders, 
Flynn opposed the idea as racial and eco­
nomically divisive. That opposition, com­
bined with black community opinion, de­
feated the Mandela referendum within the 
black community by a 3-to-l margin. Two 
years later, the secessionists tried again —
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and again suffered an overwhelming de­
feat. But both the Boston and national 
media (including Newsweek, the New York 
Times and the Phil Donahue show) gave 
sensational attention to the secession effort.
In fact, the Boston media consistently 
dow n-played Flynn's overw helm ing  
popularity among black voters, while 
highlighting the antagonism of some black 
politicians and separatists 
toward Flynn. A few years 
ago, when a maverick black 
activist threatened a "massive 
d em onstration " against 
Flynn at a scheduled Martin 
Luther King Day event, the 
Herald put the story on the 
front page. When only three 
people showed up to protest, 
the media ignored it.
Although the media 
tended to simplistically label 
him an "economic liberal" 
and ä "cultural conservative," Flynn's views 
on so-called "social issues" are not easy to 
categorize. Flynn was a strong advocate of 
gun control (he lobbied hard for the Brady 
bill), appointed many gays and lesbians to 
top jobs in City Hall, arid was the first big- 
city mayor in the country to support the 
distribution of clean needles to help fight 
the AIDS epidemic. At the same time, he 
opposed the distribution of condoms in 
public schools (even though his top health 
care advisor openly endorsed the policy) on 
the grounds that it would condone sexual 
activity among young people. Though he 
increasingly kept his distance from pro-life 
groups, he continued to oppose abortion. 
Flynn never felt any tension between his
economic and cultural view's, but many 
liberals and progressives w ere uncomfort­
able with, or perplexed by, w hat they be­
lieved was his inconsistency.
C ities on  the N ational A genda 
Flynn was a persistent critic of the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations' indifference to 
the plight of the poor. W hether speaking to 
a hom eless co alitio n  in 
Nashville, a downtown busi­
ness group in Cleveland, a 
labor union conference in 
Florida, or the National Press 
Club in W ashington, Flynn 
w as relentless in castigating 
the Republicans in the White 
House as well as the Demo­
crats in Congress for their 
failure of nerve in standing 
u p  to th e R eagan-B ush  
agenda. M any other Demo­
cratic m ayors —  looking to 
squeeze w hatever favors they could get out 
of the Republican W hite House —  thought 
Hynn w as too vocal. One colleague called 
him a "bomb throw er." The Bush admin­
istration tried several times to discredit 
Hynn. HUD Secretary Jack Kemp attacked 
him on national television.
Throughout his years as m ayor, 
Hynn played an active role in the U.S. 
Conference of M ayors (USCM). From  1985 
to 1991, he chaired the organization's task 
force on hunger, homelessness and poverty. 
He worked relentlessly to push the national 
media, his fellow m ayors, and Congress to 
address these issues* He developed a close 
friendship with the nation's grass-roots 
housing activists, including M itch Snyder.
the Boston media 
consistently down­
played Flynn's 
overwhelming 
popularity am ong 
black voters, while 
highlighting the 
antagonism of some 
black politicians. . .
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Together, in themiddleof the Reagan years, 
they successfully pushed for legislation (the 
McKinney Act) to fund housing and health 
care programs for the homeless. In 1989, 
Flynn worked with Snyder and others to 
organize a huge "Housing Now" march on 
W ashington, bringing church leaders, 
unions, and other groups into the mobili­
zation effort for more low-income housing.
Based on the success of Boston'snon- 
profit community development corpora­
tions in building low-income housing, Flynn 
pushed for federal legislation to givefederal 
housing funds to the burgeoning CDC 
movement. In 1987, he persuaded Repre­
sentative Joseph Kennedy to introduce the 
bill and, after three years of active lobbying, 
the Community Housing Partnership pro­
gram was enacted in 1990.
Based on his experience battling 
Boston's banks over lending discrimination, 
Flynn worked closely with national activist 
groups like ACORN and the Financial De­
mocracy Campaign to strengthen the fed­
eral Community Reinvestment Act —  
writing public letters and op-ed columns, 
lobbying Congress, and urging fellow  
mayors to support consumer-oriented bank 
reform. In 1989 and again in 1990, with the 
S&L debacle on the front pages, Congress 
toughened the country's limp anti-redlining 
law.
As president of the USCM from 1991 
to 1992, Flynn used tl te position to heighten 
national attention to the plight of the cities, 
the poor, and the powerless, and to push for 
more funds for housing and child care. 
Under his leadership, the USCM became a 
m uch more acti vis t grou p. Mike Brown, the 
USCM public relations staffer, observed
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that the group's public visibility— reflected 
in press clippings as well as its profile in 
Congress— dramatically increased during 
Flynn's tenure (1991-92) as president.
Soon after Flynn was elected head of 
the USCM, he proposed —  at a meeting of 
its executive board on Cape Cod in August 
1991 — that the group organize a "SaveOur 
Cities" march on Washington to coincide 
with the Presidential campaign the next 
year. His fellow mayors and the USCM staff 
expressed doubts about the idea. It would 
mean raising money, mobilizing grass-roots 
support, and possibly disrupting the 
Presidential campaign. But Flynn persisted 
and pushed his reluctant colleagues to go 
along. The Los Angeles riots exploded a 
week before the scheduled m arch, and the 
rally — 150,000 strong, led by union lead­
ers, community activists. Rev. Jesse Jackson, 
Flynn and other mayors —  helped focus 
national attention on the White Flouse and 
Congress to address the urban crisis.
Throughout the 1980s— a decade of 
neglect —  the USCM, along with the Na­
tional League of Cities, the National Civic 
League, and various foundations and think 
tanks, warned that America's urban areas 
were ticking time bombs, waiting to ex­
plode. But the political winds seemed to 
blowing in the other direction. During the 
1992Presidential campaign,CNN's William 
Schneider, the Washington Post's David 
Broder, and other pundits observed that it 
was the first Presidential election in which 
a majority of voters were suburbanites, 
making it unlikely that national candidates 
would pay attention to the problems of 
cities.
Hynn rejected thatlogic— politically.
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economically, and morally. As head of the 
USCM, Flynn remained neutral in the 1992 
Presidential campaign, but he used the or­
ganization and his own public profile to 
push all the Democratic candidates to focus 
attention on the urban crisis. He authored 
op-ed columns in major newspapers, and 
made the Sunday TV talk-show circuit, 
criticizing the Democratic candidates for 
ignoring working people, the poor, the 
homeless, and the cities. Under his lead­
ership, amid thePresidential campaign, the 
USCM co-sponsored a report with the 
progressiveEconomicPolicy Institute, Does 
America Need Cities?: An Urban Investment 
Strategy for National Prosperity, that gener­
ated considerable media attention.6 When 
the Presidential candidates came to cam­
paign in Boston, Flynn took them  to 
homeless shelters and food pantries— not 
shining downtown projects. He asked each 
candidate to convene a White House con­
ference on homelessness.
During the campaign, Flynn, on be­
half of the USCM, unveiled a public works 
plan com posed of thousands of job-creating 
projects "ready-to-go" but on the shelf due 
to lack of funding. M ost of the Democratic 
candidates ignored the plan. Even at the 
USCM-sponsored candidates' forum in 
February, only Tom Harkin embraced the 
idea of a major public investment strategy 
to rejuvenate urban economies. Butbyjune, 
the idea had taken hold. Bill Clinton and 
Jerry Brown incorporated the USCM plan 
into their campaign platforms.7
After the Democratic convention, 
Flynn campaigned for Clinton in 20 states 
and 50 cities, primarily among the urban 
poor and the predom inantly Catholic
"Reagan Democrats" among whom  he en­
joyed a great affinity and w as particularly 
effective. WhenPennsylvania Governor Bob 
Casey refused to join Hillary Clinton at a 
campaign stop in tire heavily Catholic in­
dustrial dty of Scranton (because he objected 
toClinton'spro-choice view s),M rs. Clinton 
asked Flynn, another pro-life Democrat, to 
join her. Flynn rallied the crow d, acknowl­
edging his differences w ith Clinton on 
abortion, but pointing out the overriding 
importance of key issues like jobs, health 
care, and crime. Some close Clinton aides 
believe Flynn'seffectivenessat the Scranton 
rally— and his general appeal to America's 
Catholic voters —  convinced Clinton to 
offer him the Vatican post.
M any people within Boston's media 
and political worlds criticized Flynn for his 
extensive traveling for the Democraticticket. 
But the Clinton victory offers som e  glim­
mer of hope for Am erica's cities —  in part, 
by shifting the public debate tow ard activ­
ist government. The President's economic 
recovery package included increases in 
urban program s— public w orks, housing, 
transportation, and others. A truly universal 
nationalhealthcareprogram  will lessen the 
fiscal pressures on states and cities as well 
as improve the living conditions of urban 
residents. Perhaps most im portant, the new 
federal "m otor voter" legislation (enacted 
injunetoease voter registration procedures) 
has the potential to significantly increase 
voter participation among the (predom i­
nantly urban) poor.
U nfinished Business
A s a politician, Flynn's next logical step 
would have been to mn for G overnor. He
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always resented the state government's 
choke hold on Boston's finances and its 
mistreatment of the capital dty. In 1990, 
with Michael Dukakis not seeking re-elec­
tion, polls showed Flynn to be the front­
runner, but he decided against seeking the 
governorship. Polls in early 1993 showed 
that he probably could have won the 1994 
Democratic party nomination. The contest 
against incumbent William Weld, a liber­
tarian Republican, would have been diffi­
cult, but not impossible. Some liberal 
Democrats and Independents who liked 
Flynn's economic populism would have 
abandoned him because of his opposition 
to abortion, but Flynn's track record in 
Boston, the state's troubled economy, and 
his close ties to President Clinton would 
have provided a strong foundation for a 
winnable contest.
In fact, Flynn was gearing up to run 
when Clinton asked him to be his Ambas­
sador to the Holy See. Soon after taking the 
post, Flynn began a series of quiet meetings 
with Vatican officials, American Jewish 
community leaders, and others to push the 
Vatican to recognize Israel. In his first few 
months on the new job, he returned to the 
U.S. several times to escort the Pope to 
Denver and to march in Detroit's Labor 
Day parade. He continued to speak out on 
issues of human rights and economic in­
justice.
Some observers predicted that Rynn 
would feel constrained in his new post. But 
in South Boston, it is often said that there are 
two legitimate ways to be a success— as an 
elected official or as a priest. For a poor kid 
from South Boston, being Mayor and then 
Ambassador to the Vatican certainly filled
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a lifetime ambition.
Flynn's departure for Rome in July of 
1993triggered a heated contest for mayor. It 
is a sign of Hynn's legacy that— unlike the 
1983mayoral race— none of the candidates 
to replace him campaigned on a platform to 
overturn the previous mayor's agenda or 
achievements. While Boston's next mayor 
will have a different style and agenda, he 
surqly could do worse than émula te Hynn's 
activism and social compassion.
Even so, there is still unfinished 
business in Boston. In some areas, the Hynn 
regime simply failed to cany out its agenda. 
In other areas, citizens need to redefine the 
agenda for a new era.
For example, Hynn had consistently 
attacked the elected Boston School Com­
mittee as a disaster. Its members exploited 
it as a source of large-scale patronage, ig­
nored educational policy, and used it as a 
stepping stone to higher office. Frustrated 
with the status quo, in 1991 Hynn used his 
activist approach to win a change in the 
school-governance system, getting the sta te 
legislature to give the mayor the power to 
appoint the School Committee. But Hynn 
was unprepared for the challenges of re­
forming the schools. He and the School 
Committee members he appointed battled 
constantly with the Superintendent, a black 
woman whom the previous committee had 
recruited from Texas and given a multi­
year contract. After two years of a Hynn- 
appointed committee, the schools experi­
enced no appreciable improvement. Edu­
cation must be a major priority for the next 
mayor.
Many Bostonians believe that Hynn 
mishandled his response to the murder of
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Carol Stuart, a white subur­
banite whose death seemed 
to symbolize the racial divide 
between city and suburb.
After Stuart's husband iden­
tified a black man as the killer,
Flynn sent the city's police 
into Mission Hill, a black and 
Hispanic neighborhood where the murder 
occurred and the suspect lived, to find the 
killer. When it was discovered that Stuart's 
husband was the actual killer, it looked like 
Hynn's police department had wrongly 
scapegoated an innocent black man and 
reinforced the neighborhood's view of the 
police as an invading army.
The community's reaction pushed 
Hynn to appoint a task force to recommend 
reforms of the police department. Flynn 
embraced the task force's recommendation 
to set up a community policing program. 
But tight budgets and a reluctant police 
union kept the community policing idea 
from making much headway. Getting the 
Boston Police Departm ent to work as 
neighborhood problem-solvers, as partners 
with neighborhood groups, should preoc­
cupy the next m ayor's attention.
Some components of the next agenda 
can't come from City Hall, but must emerge 
from the grass-roots. One problem, how­
ever, is the atrophy of Boston's progressive 
activist movement. Indeed, perhaps the 
biggest irony of the Flynn years was that by 
bringing so many experienced organizers 
and activists into City Hall, he grabbed 
much of the best talent away from the 
neighborhood groups, unions, and other 
organizations that had helped create the 
climate for his victory in 1983. The Flynn
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government worked closely 
with and supported many 
grass-roots organizations, but 
many of the m ost successful 
groups fell on hard times. 
Hurt by Reagan's dramatic 
cuts to VISTA, Fair Share and 
Nine-to-Five folded within a 
few years after Hynn took office, the Mas­
sachusetts Tenants Organization had diffi­
culty maintaining its m om entum , and the 
Hotel W orkers Union divorced its pro­
gressive allies by siding with William Weld, 
a decision from  which they haven't recov­
ered. The labor movement forged a short­
lived progressive coalition with community 
activists— to wage a successful referendum  
campaign in 1988 to protect the state's 
"prevailing w age" law —  but the coalition 
did not build on that m om entum .
So perhaps the biggest challenge of 
the post-Hynn era is to recharge the ba tteries 
of Boston's activists. There are some 
promising examples, such as Parents United 
for Child Care, Citizens for Safety, the Mas­
sachusetts Affordable H ousing Alliance 
Home Buyers Union, the Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative, the Tax Equity 
Alliance of M assachusetts, M assachusetts 
Senior Action, and the Commonwealth 
Coalition. Boston'sw om en'sorganizations 
have become stronger, but have yet to fulfill 
their potential in building bridges across 
race and class lines and mobilizing voters.
It's time for the city's religious lead­
ers to put their faith into action. The clergy 
can play an important role in improving 
conditions in Boston's poor and working 
class neighborhoods if they mobilize their 
congregations and constituents around is­
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sues, register them to vote, turn out the vote 
on election day, and build coalitions. This is 
beginning to happen with groups such as 
Mattapan-Dorchester Churches in Action 
and the Neighborhood of Affordable 
Housing (NOAH) in East Boston, but there 
is still a huge vacuum. A good model is 
Reverend Johnny Youngblood, who built a 
strong congregationin Brooklyn, New York 
by getting his church actively involved in 
concrete community issues and forging al­
liances with other churches and neighbor­
hood groups.
Boston's black, Latino and Asian 
communities, which are growing numeri­
cally, must find a new generation of grass­
roots leaders and elected officials who can 
build coalitions rather than fight over racial 
turf and patronage spoils. In 1983, Mel King 
mobilized the black community in the 
mayoral race because of his two decades of 
grass-roots activism. In this year's mayoral 
contest, the black community was barely 
visible. Grass-roots organization was weak 
and turnout was low. Likewise, white com­
munity activists must find new ways to 
forge alliances of mutual respect and find 
common ground with tire increasingly di­
verse communities of color.
But these groups must go beyond 
their single-issue agendas. They need to 
build broad multi-racial, multi-issue coali­
tions among neighborhood, union, envi­
ronmental and consumer groups. They need 
to unite and hammer out a clear policy 
agenda that can become the program for a 
progressive mayoral candidate. They need 
to find support from the city's foundations 
and churches.
What might some components of
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that grass-roots agenda look like?
• Boston's strong network of non­
profit community development corpora­
tions, who spent the past decade focusing 
on creating affordable housing must be­
come key players in rebuilding the city's 
neighborhood econom ies. That means 
paying m ore attention to job-creating 
business development that is vital for 
healfhy neighborhoods. The Clinton ad­
ministration has pledged to expand re­
sources for CDCs. But Boston's CDC en­
trepreneurs have to get City Hall, the state 
government, and the area's banks and in­
surance companies to invest in the CD Cs 
potential in economic development.
• After two decades of busing per­
haps it's time to return to neighborhood 
schools, not only as educational centers but 
as human service and health agencies as 
well. This may be what's needed to serve 
the existing school population (primarily 
low-income children) and to bring back 
middle class families of all colors, who have 
abandoned the public schools. But the 
initiative must come from the parents of 
school-age children, not from politicians. It 
must include a strong voice for parents, 
teachers, and principals in the management 
of local schools. School parents and then- 
allies must organize to become a political 
force. Resistance from theSchool Committee 
or the teachers' union must be met head on.
• It's time for the 60,000 tenants in 
public housing developments— run by the 
Boston Housing Authority —  to gain a 
greater voice in management. As mayor, 
Flynn helped the tenants in many privately- 
owned apartments, including troubled 
Section 8 projects, obtain more rights and
400 • FALL 1090 NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW
'FEATURE'
respect. With the d ty  government's sup­
port, tenants organized self-help initiatives 
to transform  their developm ents from  
"projects" to viablecommimities. Withhelp 
from the M etropolitan Boston Housing 
Partnership, tenants in the many HUD- 
subsidized projects in Boston— some of the 
city's worst slums —  are starting to mobi­
lize around crime and management issues. 
Ironically, the Flynn administration did not 
extend this effort to the city's own public 
housing tenants, focusing instead on im­
proving the projects' physical conditionand 
integrating the all-white developments.
• While full employment and gun 
control are the best remedies to combat 
poverty, crim e, and violence, helping 
families and young people cope with the 
brutality of daily life —  and providing a 
positive alternative to gang culture —  is a 
key ingredient in addressing the problems 
of the inner dty. Boston has many excellent 
private and public human servicesagendes, 
buttotheir consumers they form a confusing 
crazy quilt th at underm ines each  
institution's mandate. The hospitals and 
community health centers, youth and rec­
reation programs, mental health centers, 
job training agendes, Head Start and child 
care programs, and other efforts suffer from 
the bureaucratic logic that sees people as 
"clients" with specific problems rather than 
as part of families and communities. Some 
cities, such as Baltimore, have brought the 
funders and the agendes together to develop 
a comprehensive approach to human ser­
vice delivery. That can happen in Boston, 
too, but only when community groups, 
business leaders, and philanthropic donors 
demand it.
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C onclusion: The L egacy and  Lessons 
The Flynn regim e in Boston demonstrates 
both the potential and limits of progressive 
policy at the local level.
Through his populist appeal and 
polides, Flynn broadened and redefined 
the "growth coalition." The Flynn regime 
sought to accom m odate the development 
community (if not landlords), the business 
community, and the construction trade 
unions by prom oting "m anaged growth" 
and "balanced development." Flynn also 
walked a tightrope between confrontation 
and compromise with thepowerful business 
and developm ent com m unities, while 
promoting a progressive agenda that has 
helped unite white, black, Hispanic, and 
Asian communities around common in­
terests, as reflected in his electoral support 
in every area of the d ty , including the mi­
nority neighborhoods.
But even the Boston case cannot be 
replicated in all dries. Clearly, Boston's 
economic prosperity offered the Flynn re­
gime opportunities that are not available in 
other cities facing economic hard times. 
Even so, other m ayors in sim ilar situations 
have chosen other options: prom oting the 
downtown developm ent agenda over 
neighborhood concerns, eschewing neigh­
borhood involvement in planning, using 
radal and ethnic divisions for political gain.
The Hyrtn regime was willing to test 
the "d ty lim its." On a variety of policy 
questions, it "called the bluff" of business 
leaders and firms who warned that business 
would disinvestif thedty pushed its agenda. 
In doing so, the Flynn regime relied in part 
on the technical capacity and negotiating 
skills of city staff. They evaluated the pro-
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posed city policies and ad­
vised the mayor of their im­
pact on private investment.
Ultimately, however, 
these decisions were politi­
cal. Whatever their economic 
impact or technical feasibil­
ity, these policies had to be 
sold to the public while busi­
ness groups warned that they would un­
dermine Boston's economic well-being. As 
a skillful politician, Flynn promoted a pro­
gressive agenda and remained extremely 
popular, as indicated by his overwhelming 
re-election victories in 1987 and 1991.
The efforts of Boston and other local 
progressive regimes play an important role 
in mobilizing the political will for a re­
newed national policy. They also demon­
strate that with sufficient na­
tional resources and clear 
policies, localities and com­
m unity organizations can  
administerprograms without 
excessive bureaucratic red 
tape or corruption.
But no city can solve its so­
cial and economic problems 
on its own. Progressive municipal policies 
can make a difference, but they cannot ad­
dress the root causes, or even m ost of the 
symptoms, of urban distress. Unless the 
federal government is committed to ad­
dressing Am erica's urban crisis —  and 
finding common ground between dties, 
suburbs and all Americans —  the nation 
will continue to stagnate in the increasingly 
competitive global marketplace. _ N
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American Assembly. The conference pa­
pers are collected in Henry Cisneros, ed., 
Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation 
(New York: W .W. Norton, forthcoming 
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